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67 
Speech and Institutional Choice 
Thomas B. Nachbar* 
I. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION 
The digital world presents many interesting questions, but one 
question it does not present is whether it should be regulated. 
Whether digital technology, either in the form of the Internet or as 
stand-alone or otherwise-networked devices, should be regulated 
misleadingly implies that regulation is actually a choice. Because its 
contours are completely and totally defined by humans, digital 
technology cannot help but be regulated down to its slightest detail. 
Nor is the regulation of digital technology coming in some distant 
future. It’s here and it is as complete today as it is ever going to be.  
Particular regulations may be problematic or imperfect in relation 
to their goals, but because humans define digital technology, its 
regulation is axiomatically absolute. This point is lost on practically 
no one, at least not since the late 1990s, when the wave of irrational 
exuberance displayed by the Internet’s first admirers in the legal 
academy broke on the shores of reality and receded back into the 
sea.1 Of course, in this human-defined place, states will insist on 
certain controls on speech, controls that will vary based on the state’s 
dominant political or social culture. It has always been folly to 
believe that authoritarian governments accustomed to controlling 
information would cede control over so precious a resource without a 
fight, or that they would be completely ineffective in doing so.  
Even if an authoritarian state cannot successfully control all of the 
conduits by which information crosses its borders, successfully 
targeting a few of the largest ones is likely to bring enough of a return 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This paper was presented at the 
Rehnquist Court and the First Amendment conference hosted by the Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy in St. Louis, Missouri, on November 18, 2005. 
 1. See Tim Wu, When Law and the Internet First Met, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 171 (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p67 Nachbar book pages.doc  10/31/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 21:67 
 
 
to justify the effort, a point at the heart of John Palfrey and Robert 
Rogoyski’s Article for this conference.2 What is true of states and 
regulation for political gain will be true of private interests and 
regulation for financial gain. Control over the means of creating and 
sharing the digital content would provide any firm substantial rents, 
either in the form of higher prices or by favoring its own content or 
associated technologies.3 The pervasive presence of network 
effects—both actual and virtual—in digital technology markets 
suggests that such private actors are likely to enjoy considerable 
regulatory control over particular technologies once dominated,4 and 
there is every reason to believe that such control, once vested, will be 
employed to the benefit of those who hold control and to the 
detriment (or, at the very best, indifference) of those who do not. The 
likely result is both wealth transfer to those who control particular 
digital technologies and, as a consequence of their vested interest in 
maintaining that control, the retardation of future technological 
development.5 
 
 2. See John Palfrey, Jr., & Robert Rogoyski, The Move to the Middle: The Enduring 
Threat of “Harmful” Speech to the End-to-End Principle, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 31 
(2006); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 207–08 (1999). 
A major source of informal discussion among my co-panelists was a (then-)developing story 
about the use of web censorship in Tunisia, which was at that time hosting the World Summit 
on the Information Society, a worldwide conference of governments, business, and NGOs to 
discuss Internet governance issues. See Victoria Shannon, Tunis Chided over Web Censorship, 
INTL. HERALD TRIB., Nov. 17, 2005, at 1R. More recently, China has succeeded in getting 
Google and other Internet services to assist it in controlling the flow of information across 
China’s borders, complicity that has subjected the companies to potentially contradictory 
scrutiny by a government with a competing claim to their obedience, the United States. See 
generally Tom Zeller, Jr., Web Firms Questioned on Dealings in China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2006, at C1. 
 3. Microsoft, for instance, attempted to use its operating system monopoly to dominate 
the market for Internet browsers, a move that was designed in-turn to protect it from a challenge 
to its monopoly in operating systems. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 95–96 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Jim Speta, Maintaining Competition in Information Platforms: Vertical 
Restrictions in Emerging Telecommunications Markets, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 185, 
186–87 (2002).  
 4. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. 
L. REV. 1041, 1045–52 (1996). 
 5. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 67 (1st ed. 2001). 
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II. THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY 
Regulation by technology has always been a necessary part of the 
digital landscape, and regulation by law—whether perceived as 
harmful to individual freedoms or as a salutary check on 
overreaching by market participants—will only increase. Thus, it is 
only natural that legal academics have devoted considerable attention 
to matters of digital technology in the past ten years. The work 
generated by legal academics in the field—in both technology policy 
broadly and the Internet specifically—can be divided roughly into 
two categories: attempts to hash out applications of particular 
regulatory agendas to digital technology (such as the significance of 
copyright law or First Amendment doctrine to the Internet or to the 
development of new digital technologies);6 and arguments that a 
particular set of values should underlie and define that inevitable 
regulation.7 Some work, of course, runs the gamut.8 
Most of this work is both necessary and important, but its 
technological focus has frequently caused its authors to largely ignore 
a more general quality of any rule that defines how most humans will 
respond to it: the identity of the rule’s author. In their emphasis on 
coming up with the “right” substance or values for Internet 
regulation, many have ignored the question of the regulation’s 
origin.9 It’s a surprising omission, since one of the earliest 
 
 6. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, 
The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757 (1995); Philip J. Weiser, The 
Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (2003). 
 7. See, e.g., LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 5; Jack M. Balkin, Digital 
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information 
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-
End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 
(2001); Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006). 
 8. LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 2. 
 9. Many but certainly not all. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE 
INTERNET? 153 (2006) (arguing for political legitimacy as the basis for relying on nation-states 
to regulate the Internet). A substantial amount of work has also been done by some, including 
my co-panelist John Palfrey, on the problem of who should control the root name directories for 
the Internet and the various problems presented by the vesting of that authority in a U.S.-
dominated agency, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). See, 
e.g., A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; 
John Palfrey, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray into Global Internet Democracy 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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proponents of the value lauded by so many who write in this field—
“openness”—justified it on its power to prevent capture of the 
architecture of the Internet by a particular class of (corporate) 
actors.10 What started as an architectural preference intended to 
prevent private control over what are inherently political decisions 
has become an architecture that lacks any particular claim to politics 
at all. 
While many have nominated particular values for codification in 
the design and regulation of digital technology, few have discussed 
how to make those who choose those values or the regulation 
implementing them politically legitimate. Most simply ignore the 
question of source, but even those who do not rarely argue for a 
political organization to set technical, and hence regulatory, policy 
for the Internet. My co-panelist, Jonathan Zittrain, for instance, has 
elsewhere proposed “a 21st century international Manhattan Project 
which brings together people of good faith in government, academia, 
and the private sector for the purpose of shoring up the miraculous 
information technology grid” that is the Internet.11 This is, as an 
initial matter, an odd example; although the actual Manhattan Project 
was collaborative, it was a decidedly top-down affair, controlled so 
tightly by a single, dominant entity (the United States government) 
that it was conducted under the strictest possible secrecy.12 The 
 
Failed, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 409 (2004). Much of this work has been quite good and the 
topic is certainly important, but it is critical to remember that ICANN does not set policy that 
alters the technical nature of the Internet; it only allocates the names that are used on the 
Internet. ICANN’s power is significant, but it is not definitional of the Internet in the same way 
that the Internet Engineering Task Force’s standard-setting role is. 
 10. See LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 207. 
We are entering a very different world where code is written within companies. . . . 
We are entering a world in which code is corporate in a commercial sense, and leaving 
a world in which code is was corporate in a very different sense. 
 To the extent that this code is law, to the extent that it is a chosen structure of 
constraint, we should worry about how it is structured and whose interests may define 
its constraint, just as we worry when any lawmaking power is assumed by a private 
body. If code is law, who are the lawmakers? What values are being embedded into the 
code? 
Id. 
 11. Jonathan Zittrain, Without a Net, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2006, at 33, 38. 
 12. LESLIE GROVES, NOW IT CAN BE TOLD: THE STORY OF THE MANHATTAN PROJECT 
(1962). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/5
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Manhattan Project was not “free” or “open” in any sense of those 
words.  
More importantly, though, the image of the Manhattan Project’s 
convergence of great minds to work together in isolation suggests 
that solving the Internet’s problems is best done without too much 
interference from traditional regulatory (and therefore inherently 
political) institutions. The call for isolated consideration of the 
Internet’s architecture is inconsistent with the realization that, for the 
Internet, technology and policy are inseparable; defining technology 
is defining policy. Policy should be set by political bodies, but most 
who have written on this topic have either argued for apolitical 
technocratic administration of the Internet,13 or have assessed 
potential regulators not by their political qualifications but rather by 
the values they represent and the substance of the rules they will 
likely impose.14 
But most common understandings about what makes a rule 
legitimate focus not on the content of the rule, but rather on its 
source.15 When the rules that govern the Internet are widely 
understood to govern human behavior as well, people will become 
concerned with who is making those rules, and when that happens, 
 
 13. E.g., Kofi Annan, The U.N. Isn’t a Threat to the Net, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2005, at 
A19 (“All say that the day-to-day management of the Internet should be left to technical 
institutions, not least to shield it from the heat of day-to-day politics.”). 
 14. E.g., LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 207 
(suggesting that the identity of Internet code writers is important, but justifying his preference 
for the IETF based on its members’ preference for producing “no more than code that would 
work,” not on their political legitimacy as regulators); John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Robert Rogoyski, 
The Move to the Middle: The Enduring Threat of “Harmful” Speech to the End-to-End 
Principle, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 31 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The 
Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 876 (2004) 
(arguing for a layered approach to Internet governance that mirrors the technical layers of the 
Internet, because doing so will help to maintain “a transparent Internet”). Another possibility 
would be to focus on neither substance nor the identity of the originator, but on the correct 
process for making rules. Thus, Michael Froomkin suggests that the legitimacy of the IETF’s 
authority rests on the extended and robust discourse in which it engages in setting those rules (a 
process so unconcerned with origins that its participants are entirely self-selected). See A. 
Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003). The necessary procedures for securing the legitimacy of laws, on 
the other hand, has never been so highly specified (unlike the highly specified procedures for 
selecting lawmakers). 
 15. At least in easy cases, and most rules likely to govern through technology are going to 
be easy cases. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the issue of Internet governance will become a live one. We are 
seeing the first disputes right now. For example, the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) dictates 
who may use which domain names (or, more importantly, who may 
use which top-level domains, such as “.com,” “.us,” and “.ru”) by 
virtue of a contract with the United States Department of 
Commerce.16 Those who do not consider the Department of 
Commerce (or the United States, for that matter) a legitimate source 
of regulation (such as the government of the country represented by 
the “.ru” top-level domain) may find American control over domain 
naming problematic, and understandably so. Popular recognition of 
the regulatory force of Internet technology will necessarily precipitate 
a political battle over which institutions should define the Internet’s 
technological landscape. The same is likely to be true for the 
regulation of other digital technologies, such as digital rights 
management (DRM), that have the potential to control what content 
we have access to and how we experience that access.17  
The greatest beneficiary of the current policy-focused approach to 
evaluating network regulators has been the end-to-end concept of 
network design and its current guardian on the Internet, the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF). End-to-end dictates that a network 
should interfere as little as possible with the content it carries—it 
should provide carriage only, giving as much freedom as possible to 
the “ends” of the network to share information in the way they find 
most useful.18 The concept has been given reality on the Internet, 
dominating the protocols that control how the Internet operates,19 and 
its appeal among Internet activists is near universal.20  
End-to-end may have many technological and philosophical 
merits, but its regulatory pedigree is not one of them. End-to-end’s 
 
 16. On ICANN and its relationship with the U.S. Department of Commerce, see MILTON 
MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT (2002). 
 17. See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management 
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 539 (2005). 
 18. See J.H. Saltzer, D.P. Reed & D.D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in Systems Design, 
ACM TRANSACTIONS IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS 277–88 (1984). 
 19. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 7, at 930–32. 
 20. See LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 207; Lemley 
& Lessig, supra note 7, at 932–33; Palfrey & Rogoyski, supra note 14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/5
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implementation on the Internet has been the product of a “rough 
consensus” (as all consensus must be) among the self-appointed 
members of the IETF;21 put another way, end-to-end dominates the 
Internet because it is the only networking standard that has achieved 
consensus among Internet engineers active in the standard-setting 
process. That’s not exactly a mark in its favor. The use of consensus 
to define the Internet’s technology should give pause to anyone who 
recognizes the necessary overlap between defining the Internet’s 
technological shape and defining its political shape. The poor 
suitability of consensus as a policymaking device for large groups of 
people with widely divergent interests is self-evident (the oft-raised 
problems of public choice endemic in representative governments 
pale in comparison). Certainly, most Internet users would be 
surprised to learn that the way the Internet works is defined by a 
group of technophiles whose only motivation to serve is the strength 
of their own beliefs (and perhaps interests). I doubt that surprise 
would be a happy one. 
III. THE REHNQUIST COURT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
The work of courts, unlike that of commentators, is inherently tied 
to the institutions of regulation. Courts often mediate between 
institutional actors, frequently deciding not the substance of policy in 
the first instance, but rather allocating policymaking authority among 
competing institutions. No Court in recent history has been more 
conscious of its role in allocating power among regulatory actors than 
the Rehnquist Court, a consciousness displayed in particular in its 
revitalization of the limits imposed by federalism.22 First Amendment 
 
 21. See INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, TAO OF THE IETF: A NOVICE’S GUIDE TO THE 
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (2001), available at http://www.ietf.org/tao.html, for a 
description of the IETF’s decisionmaking process; see also Susan P. Crawford, The ICANN 
Experiment, 12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 438 (2004) (“The idea that ‘who shows up’ 
may be taken as a representative sample of the rest of the world” underlies the organization of 
both ICANN and the IETF); Froomkin, supra note 14, at 757. 
 22. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking a federal statute, but 
explaining that a state would have the power to promulgate the same law); cf. New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“We have always understood that even where 
Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain 
acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”); see also 
John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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caselaw nominally pertains not to debates over constitutional 
“structure,” but rather to those over “rights,” but even in an area 
dominated by concern over individual freedoms, the Rehnquist Court 
has frequently decided free speech cases on institutional, rather than 
solely libertarian, grounds. 
Perhaps the most telling example of an institutional First 
Amendment is the plurality opinion in Denver Area Educational 
Television Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.23 In Denver Area, the Court 
confronted two provisions of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 that granted permissive 
authority to cable operators to block “patently offensive and indecent 
content” on certain channels.24 One provision (section 10(a)) 
authorized blocking on so-called “leased access channels,” channels 
reserved for lease by commercial entities unaffiliated with the cable 
operator.25 A second provision (section 10(c)) authorized blocking on 
“public access” channels, channels whose content is determined by 
the local municipality, either directly or by its designee.26 Sections 
10(a) and 10(c) granted cable operators identical discretion to control 
ostensibly identical content, yet the Court found section 10(a) 
constitutional but section 10(c) not.27 Four of the justices found that 
their regulation of identical content rendered sections 10(a) and 10(c) 
constitutionally indistinguishable;28 those that did not necessarily 
found the difference between these provisions not in the relative 
 
Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 491–92 (2002) (recognizing the institutional 
implications of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence, but ascribing it to a considered policy of 
imposing fewer restrictions on individuals). 
 23. 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
 24. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 § 10(a), (c) (1992) (codified in scattered 
sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 25. Id. § 10(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(h)). 
 26. Id. § 10(c) (implemented by 47 CFR § 76.702 (1995)). See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 
760-61. The Court also considered a provision that required cable operators to segregate certain 
“patently offensive” or indecent content to particular channels, and to block those channels to 
all subscribers who did not request access. Id. at 753–60. The Court analyzed that mandatory 
provision using typical content-based speech analysis, and, in the only part of the opinion 
gaining a majority of votes, struck it for its failure to satisfy the least-restrictive-means test 
applied to all content-based speech regulations. Id. 
 27. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 765 (plurality opinion); id. at 774 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 28. Id. at 779–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 826–31 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the only argument for 
distinguishing § 10(a) and 10(c), that “public access” channels are public fora). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/5
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value or potential harm of the content being blocked, but rather in the 
relative institutional claims to control the content carried on the 
different types of channels.  
The plurality opinion was written by Justice Breyer, who found 
section 10(a) constitutional on largely substantive grounds by 
comparing the restriction to a constitutionally permissible ban on 
indecent content and finding it less restrictive.29 Of course, exactly 
the same substantive rationale could have applied to the blocking of 
public access channels authorized by section 10(c), but in his 
discussion of that provision, Justice Breyer practically ignored 
substantive standards for speech regulation, and instead pitted the 
interests of the quasi-public bodies that make programming decisions 
for public access channels against the potential “veto” of the cable 
operator.30 Although cable operators carry an identical power relative 
to lessees of leased access channels, it was only in the context of 
public access that Justice Breyer found a real threat of posed by 
erroneous use of the veto against “borderline” content, a “threat [that] 
must bulk large within a system that already has publicly accountable 
systems for maintaining responsible programs.”31 
Most free-speech cases do not present such stark institutional 
choices. Instead, they raise questions that go to the substance of the 
regulation and its validity in light of traditional, familiar free-speech 
tests, such as whether a particular regulation is supported by a 
sufficient government interest and, if so, whether the statute is 
sufficiently closely tailored to survive First Amendment review.32 
But many free speech cases do present institutional dimensions, and 
the Court has been ready and willing to engage those institutional 
questions over the last two decades.  
 
 29. Id. at 743–47. 
 30. Id. at 763. 
 31. Id. In fairness, Justice Breyer was able to raise only three votes (including his own) in 
support of his analysis. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence (joined by Justice Ginsburg) would have 
decided the case by designating public access channels as public fora and finding § 10(c) to be 
an unconstitutional content-based restriction on those fora. Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 32. E.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (striking down a federal anti-
pornography statute on the basis that filtering would be a less restrictive means of shielding 
children from indecent material). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Take, for example, both Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group33 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.34 Both 
cases involved the use of state anti-discrimination laws to prevent the 
exclusion of individuals from private organizations on the basis of 
their sexual orientation. In Hurley, the access sought was to the 
privately organized Boston St. Patrick’s Day Parade; in Dale, it was 
access to a position as an Assistant Scoutmaster for the Boy Scouts of 
America.35 The Court held in both cases that the groups’ 
constitutional rights of association prohibited the use of state anti-
discrimination laws to require access.36  
United States v. American Library Ass’n, Inc.37 also dealt with the 
roles of institutional actors, albeit not as a matter of direct conflict, as 
in Hurley and Dale. American Library Ass’n addressed the 
constitutionality of the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA),38 
which requires libraries to install Internet filtering software on all 
computers used by patrons as a condition of receiving federal 
subsidies for Internet access.39 The Court held that the burden 
imposed by the statute on library patrons was substantially reduced 
by the fact that libraries have traditionally exercised substantial 
discretion in deciding what materials to make available to the public. 
Given this, it was permissible for Congress to piggyback the CIPA 
filters on the libraries’ institutional role as mediators of information 
to further the (ostensibly permissible) statutory objective of limiting 
children’s access to indecent content.40  
Cases like Dale and Hurley could be viewed simply as cases about 
the constitutional reach of state anti-discrimination laws; it was only 
by recognizing the institutional interests of entities such as the Boy 
 
 33. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 34. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 35. Id. at 644–45; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561. Actually, the access in Hurley was not denied 
based on the sexual orientation of the marchers, but on their message. The organizers of the 
parade disclaimed any intent to disqualify marchers based on their sexual orientation, nor did 
any of the marchers that were denied access claim they were excluded on that basis. Hurley, 
515 U.S. at 572. 
 36. Dale, 530 U.S. at 652–53; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
 37. 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 38. Pub. L. No. 106-554 tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763A, 335 (2000). 
 39. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 201. 
 40. Id. at 207–08 (plurality opinion); id. at 217 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Scouts and the organizers of the Boston St. Patrick’s Day Parade that 
the Court found a serious (and indeed overwhelming) constitutional 
interest to challenge state control.41 In American Library Ass’n, the 
Court recognized the importance of institutional actors in a very 
different way, relying on the institutional role of libraries as 
information intermediaries in order to uphold the constitutionality of 
a federal statute restricting access to speech. 
I do not mean to suggest that the Court (or at least the Denver 
Area plurality) was particularly prescient in recognizing the potential 
for private actors to exercise what is effectively regulatory control, 
nor am I claiming a new theory of constitutional interpretation that 
seeks to re-envision all speech regulations as matters of institutional 
choice. Rather, my claim is a modest one—that the Rehnquist Court 
has been quick to recognize the institutional dimensions of speech 
regulation, a propensity that is of a piece with its larger enterprise of 
carefully identifying the boundaries between various members of the 
regulatory universe. As we choose the institutions that define the 
Internet and other digital technologies, we would do well to take a 
page from the Rehnquist Court’s understanding of the roles of 
competing institutions and institutional choice apart from our policy 
preferences as to the substantive and technical values that regulators 
are likely to include in their chosen brand of regulation.  
To say that we should take the roles of regulatory institutions 
seriously is not necessarily to say that those who define our digital 
universe should be subject to some form of higher legal scrutiny; 
Supreme Court jurisprudence again provides valuable guidance. The 
Court has been correct to resist the temptation to narrow the state 
action requirement in First Amendment cases, with cases like Marsh 
v. Alabama42 rightly serving as the exception, rather than the rule. It 
is only when a private entity actually acts as a regulator that it merits 
some sort of higher scrutiny for assuming a regulatory, rather than a 
participatory, role. The similarity between the privately owned 
“company town” in Marsh and “any other American town” was a 
 
 41. See also McGinnis, supra note 22, at 492–93 (arguing that the “Rehnquist Court has 
bolstered the autonomy of mediating institutions, particularly civil associations, against 
government power,” and citing Dale as an example). 
 42. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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point the Court made several times in Marsh itself.43 It is the 
institutional role served by an actor, not its legal form, that should 
drive the analysis. It may have been fairly straightforward to identify 
who was a regulator and who was a mere property owner in the age 
of Marsh; it will become increasingly difficult to do so when the 
terrain changes from one of real property rights and anti-leafleting 
rules, to one of defining the form of the protocols over which our 
email will (or will not) be carried. 
Of course, identifying a speech interest that is implicated by 
private regulatory conduct does not suggest any particular response. 
My analysis does not suggest that the actions of private technology 
standard setters are subject to First Amendment review. In Denver 
Area, the challenge was to regulatory action by the FCC, not by a 
cable operator. Even in Marsh, First Amendment review by courts 
did not come into play until the defendant was cited by a state-actor 
sheriff’s deputy and convicted by a state court for violation of a state 
statute.44 The analysis does, however, suggest that when private 
entities act like regulators in their own right, government has 
considerably more leeway to interfere than in the case of an 
unambiguously private entity whose business less closely resembles 
the business of governing. Marsh suggests directly applying 
constitutional limits to private actors, but cases testing the state’s 
power to impose such obligations by statute are much more common. 
Increased deference to private entities acting in a quasi-regulatory 
capacity is the lesson of Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins,45 the 
doctrinal precursor to Hurley and Dale, which held not that the First 
Amendment independently required a private entity (a shopping 
center) to provide a forum for speech, but rather that, given the 
conflicting interests at stake, the state had the discretion do so.46 
Legislatures, rather than the First Amendment, are our primary line of 
protection against private regulators.  
 
 43. Id. at 502, 503. 
 44. Id. at 503–04. 
 45. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 46. Id. at 81; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (upholding 
the “fairness doctrine,” which required broadcasters to devote free time to responses to 
editorializing because of the “fiduciary” obligations a broadcaster undertakes by virtue of their 
privileged status as an FCC licensee). 
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The Rehnquist Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has much 
to offer in resolving the many problems presented by digital 
technologies and the Internet, but it may very well be that the 
Rehnquist Court’s greatest contribution is not any of its substantive 
constitutional rules of free speech, but rather its willingness to both 
recognize the significance of institutions and to explicitly factor 
respective institutional roles into constitutional analysis.  
Over the last decade, several First Amendment cases have 
presented the Court not with a choice over whether there will be 
speech, but rather with a choice over what institution should have the 
discretion to decide what speech will take place. The Court has been 
quick to recognize the institutional interests at play in such cases, and 
so should we. We face the same institutional choices when we 
consider new technologies whose widespread acceptance will occur 
through non-market methods or will otherwise effectively regulate 
how we use digital technologies, including the Internet, even if the 
necessity of choosing between competing institutions is not presented 
as plainly as it was in cases like Denver Area, Hurley, and Dale.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Recognizing that those who define the technical shape of 
technologies like the Internet also define their political shape requires 
that we take a page from the Rehnquist Court’s institutional approach 
to resolving questions of regulatory control. Just as we would not 
delegate policymaking to a group of unaccountable philosopher 
kings, we should blanche at the thought of allowing apolitical 
institutions to define the technologies that promise to regulate our 
lives as completely as the Internet will, even if we happen to agree 
with their particular platform of control. 
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